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McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) 
Allison Barnwell 
 
The United States Supreme Court ruled that large areas of 
Oklahoma, including much of the City of Tulsa, are reservation land. The 
case arose from an Oklahoma state court’s conviction of Jimcy McGirt on 
several criminal offenses. Mr. McGirt argued the State of Oklahoma 
lacked jurisdiction to prosecute because he was an enrolled member of the 
Seminole Nation of Oklahoma and committed his crimes on the Creek 
Reservation. Under the Major Crimes Act, only the federal government 
has the power to try tribal members for crimes committed on reservation 
lands. In a five to four decision, the Court held that Congress never 
disestablished the Creek Reservation, and therefore, Oklahoma had no 
jurisdiction over Mr. McGirt.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
McGirt v. Oklahoma1 is Mr. McGirt’s pro se post-conviction 
appeal from his Oklahoma state court conviction for several serious sexual 
crimes.2 Mr. McGirt is an enrolled member of the Seminole Nation of 
Oklahoma,3 and on appeal, Mr. McGirt argued the State of Oklahoma had 
no right to prosecute the crimes he committed in Northeastern Oklahoma 
because the area where he committed the crimes was reserved to the 
Muscogee Creek Tribe (“the Tribe”).4 Under the Major Crimes Act 
(“MCA”), states generally have no jurisdiction to prosecute tribal 
members for crimes committed in “Indian country.”5  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1832, the Tribe entered into a treaty with the United States for 
land in Oklahoma in exchange for the Tribe’s ceding of “all lands in the 
East.”6 The United States government promised land to the Tribe for a 
“permanent home to the whole Creek Nation.”7 Oklahoma courts, 
 
1.  McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020). 
2.        Id. at 2459. 
3.        Id. 
4.  Id. 
5.       Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §1153(a) (2018); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 
U.S. 99, 102–03 (1993)). 
6.  Id. at 2460 (citing to Treaty with the Creeks, Arts. XIV, Mar. 24, 
1832, 7 Stat. 366, 367 [hereinafter 1832 Treaty]). The Muscogee Creek people were 
forced to cede “all their land, East of the Mississippi” in exchange for the treaty 
promise that “the Creek country west of the Mississippi shall be solemnly guaranteed 
to the Creek Indians.” 1832 Treaty, Arts. I, XIV, 7 Stat. 366, 368. The Creek people 
left their ancestral homes in Georgia and Alabama in what is known as the Trail of 
Tears to arrive in Northeastern Oklahoma. McGirt, at 6. 
7.  Id. at 2459 (citing Treaty with the Creeks, preamble, Feb. 14, 1833, 
7 Stat. 418 (1833 Treaty)). 
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however, refused to recognize parts of the land guaranteed to the Tribe by 
treaty, including much of the city of Tulsa, Oklahoma. Mr. McGirt 
committed crimes on land within the historic boundaries of the Creek 
Reservation, but land not recognized by Oklahoma courts as Indian 
Territory.8  
Oklahoma asserted jurisdiction over Mr. McGirt’s crimes, and he 
was convicted in an Oklahoma state court of three sexual offenses.9 Mr. 
McGirt’s post-conviction petition came nearly a month after the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued a decision in Murphy 
v. Royal.10 There, the court held large swaths of land in Northeastern 
Oklahoma, including some of the same land at issue in McGirt, remained 
a reservation for the Tribe despite Oklahoma’s assertion that the Creek 
Reservation had been disestablished.11 Mr. McGirt filed his first of several 
post-conviction petitions in Oklahoma, and he presented arguments based 
on the Tenth Circuit’s holding.12 When the Oklahoma state courts 
dismissed Mr. McGirt’s appeals, Mr. McGirt appealed his case to the 
United States Supreme Court.13  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Court analyzed three arguments raised on review: (1) whether 
the Creek Reservation was disestablished, (2) whether Congress had 
established a reservation for the Creek Nation, and (3) whether the MCA 
applied to Northeastern Oklahoma.14  
 
A. Despite Broken Promises to the Tribe, Congress has not 
Disestablished the Creek Reservation 
 
The Court began its analysis by noting the multiple treaties 
establishing the Creek Reservation in Northeastern Oklahoma and 
explaining the law for disestablishing a reservation.15 Congress alone 
holds the power to breach its own promises or treaties, and therefore, only 
an Act of Congress may disestablish a reservation.16 Further, Congress 
must explicitly express its intent to disestablish in legislation as it has done 
in the past.17 The Court then dismissed three arguments advanced by 
 
8. Id. at 2460.  
9.  Id. at 2459. 
10. Id. at 2460; Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), rev’d 
sub nom. Sharp v. Murphy 589 U.S. ___ (2019). 
11. Murphy, 875 F.3d at 907–09. The claims in Sharp were resolved by 
the Court’s holding in McGirt. Sharp, 589 U.S. ___ (2019). 
12.  McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2460. 
13.  Id.  
14. Id. at 2459–82.  
15. Id. at 2460–62. 
16.  Id. at 2462. 
17.  Id. (citing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470; Hagen v. Utah, 510 
U.S. 399, 412 (1994); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504, n. 22 (1973); Nebraska v. 
Parker, 577 U.S. 481, ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 6)). 
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Oklahoma attempting to prove that, despite the lack of express 
congressional intent, the Creek Reservation was nonetheless 
disestablished.  
First, Oklahoma argued the “allotment era,” when Congress 
pressured tribes to parcel their lands into smaller lots owned by 
individuals, was Congress’s first step in disestablishing the Creek 
Reservation.18 However, the Court explained that absent express 
congressional intent “the Creek Reservation survived allotment,”19 and the 
MCA contemplates private land ownership within reservation 
boundaries.20 Congress may have intended allotment to be the first step in 
ending reservations, but Congress never followed through to disestablish 
the Creek Reservation. The Court stated that “Congress may have passed 
allotment laws to create the conditions for disestablishment. But to equate 
allotment with disestablishment would confuse the first step of a march 
with arrival at its destination.”21 
Second, Oklahoma argued Congress’ intrusions on the Tribe’s 
self-governance during the allotment era was evidence of 
disestablishment.22 Over time, Congress stripped away the authority and 
autonomy of the Tribe, but the Court noted that the laws were only 
necessary because the Tribe retained its status as a sovereign nation.23 By 
1967, Congress reversed course and began to reestablish tribal 
sovereignty.24 The Creek Nation has since ratified a new constitution, 
established branches of government, and generally governs the Creek 
Nation democratically.25 Congress may have taken the first step toward 
disestablishment with the allotment era, but it did not dissolve the Tribe or 
disestablish the Creek Reservation.26 
Finally, Oklahoma argued for disestablishment by pointing to 
historic practices and demographics in Northeastern Oklahoma.27 
Oklahoma urged the Court to adopt a three-step rule to find 
disestablishment by examining the facts of the laws passed by Congress, 
contemporary events, and later events and demographics.28 The Court 
rejected the proposed test and instead cited its responsibility to “follow the 
original meaning of the law,”29 and clarified that the only appropriate time 
 
18.  Id. at 2463. 
19.  Id. at 2464. 
20.  Id. 
21. Id. at 2465.  
22.  Id.  
23.  Id. at 2466 (“And, its own way, the congressional incursion on tribal 
legislative processes only served to prove the power: Congress would have had no 
need to subject tribal legislation to Presidential review if the Tribe lacked any authority 
to legislate.”). 
24.  Id. at 2467. 
25.  Id.  
26.  Id. at 2468. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. (citing New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. _ (2019) (slip op., at 
6)).  
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for the Court to look to evidence outside the plain meaning of the statutory 
language is when an ambiguous statutory phrase or term is in question.30 
According to the Court, Oklahoma failed to raise any ambiguity in the 
statutes in question.31  
The Court then addressed the dissent’s reasoning. The Court 
condemned the dissent’s use of extratextual evidence, and reaffirmed that 
the Supreme Court has never found a reservation disestablished without 
first finding a statute that required disestablishment.32 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Gorsuch also rebuked the theory that history and 
demographics could disestablish a reservation, and noted that the adoption 
of a proposed test to disestablish a reservation without clear congressional 
intent would usurp the legislature of its function and “treat Native 
American claims of statutory right as less valuable than others.”33 
Allowing a state to disestablish a reservation through ignoring the law, 
fraudulently causing Indian landowners to lose titles to their land, and 
predicting the end of a reservation would be “the rule of the strong, not the 
rule of law.”34  
 
B. Congress Established a Reservation for  
the Creek Nation through Treaties 
 
Oklahoma next argued that Congress had never actually 
established a reservation for the Creek in the first place.35 Instead of being 
a recognized reservation, Oklahoma proposed that the Tribe qualified as a 
“dependent Indian community.”36 A “dependent Indian community” 
status, Oklahoma argued, is more easily lost than a reservation.37 
Oklahoma claimed reservation land must be “reserved from sale.”38 The 
Creek Nation, unlike other tribes, received a land patent from the United 
States under the Treaty of 1833, and Oklahoma contended the Tribe’s land 
therefore did not qualify as a reservation because it was not “reserved from 
sale.”39  
The Court disagreed with Oklahoma’s argument, and held that 
while no specific words are required to establish a reservation, the 
language in the treaties in question has been repeatedly held to establish a 
reservation.40 Further, land held in fee title is not incompatible with 
reservation status.41  
 
 
30.  Id. 
31.      Id.  
32.  Id. at 2470. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. at 2474. 
35.  Id.  
36.  Id.  
37.  Id. at 2475. 
38.  Id.  
39.  Id.  
40.  Id. (citing Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 390 (1902)). 
41.  Id. 
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C. Eastern Oklahoma is Subject to the Major Crimes Act 
 
Oklahoma next argued the MCA has never applied to the eastern 
half of Oklahoma because the language of the Oklahoma Enabling Act 
implies that the State has jurisdiction over all people and several statutes 
discuss the assignment of cases in court in Indian Territory.42 Oklahoma 
posited that it would be unthinkable for Congress to leave a jurisdictional 
gap under the MCA, where the federal government could not prosecute 
Indian-on-Indian crimes committed in Indian country, and therefore, 
Congress must have intended for Oklahoma to assert jurisdiction upon 
statehood.43 The Court rejected this argument, because when Oklahoma 
gained statehood in 1907, the MCA applied.44 Oklahoma may have 
continued to try Indians for crimes committed anywhere within Oklahoma, 
but this practice deviated from the requirements of the MCA.45 The Court 
noted jurisdictional gaps under the MCA are common and therefore the 
gap in jurisdiction did not grant Oklahoma jurisdiction.46 
 
D. Policy Arguments for Disestablishment are  
not a Legal Basis to Ignore the Law 
 
Finally, Oklahoma argued that the consequences of finding that 
the Creek Reservation was intact were so transformative that the Court 
should find for disestablishment.47 Specifically, Oklahoma pointed to the 
possibility of other tribes seeking enforcement of treaty promises, and that 
nearly half of Oklahoma residents could end up living within Indian 
country.48  
The Court was not convinced by Oklahoma’s policy arguments, 
and refuted Oklahoma’s claim that finding for Mr. McGirt would have 
such “transformative” effects as Oklahoma warned.49 First, the Court 
noted that other tribes seeking vindication of treaty rights must 
individually bring claims, because the question before the Court only 
concerned the Creek Reservation.50 Second, the majority noted that there 
are other areas where significant non-Indian populations live in or near 
reservations without disastrous consequences.51  
In a sweeping condemnation of the policy reasons put forth by 
both Oklahoma and the dissent, the Court cautioned that “the magnitude 
 
42.  Id. at 2476. 
43.  Id. at 2476. 
44.  Id. at 2477. 
45.  Id. at 2478. 
46.  Id. (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 704-706 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting)). 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. at 2479. 
49.  Id.  
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. (describing Tacoma, Washington, and Mount Pleasant, 
Michigan).  
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of the legal wrong is no reason to perpetuate it.”52 The Court outlined why 
the implications for both criminal and civil law were not relevant to the 
question before the Court.53 However, the Court held that the drastic 
changes Oklahoma warned of were overstated, especially since the Creek 
Nation already had hundreds of intergovernmental agreements in place 
with the State.54 
 
IV.  DISSENT 
 
The dissent, written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by 
Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Thomas, disagreed with the Court’s 
dismissal of the extratextual evidence, and used the three-part test 
suggested by Oklahoma to determine historic practice and demographics 
evinced disestablishment of the Creek Reservation.55 The dissent first 
looked to Congress’s intention in various statutes passed by Congress, the 
contemporaneous understanding of the legislation and historical context, 
and the subsequent understanding of the reservation and pattern of 
settlement.56 In light of all the relevant evidence, the dissent concluded 
that Congress intended to disestablish the Reservation.57 The dissent 
finished its opinion by reciting concerns that non-Indians living on 
reservation land would be burdened by the change in governance.58 
Justice Thomas joined the dissent and also wrote separately to 
opine the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeal’s decision.59  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
McGirt is a landmark Supreme Court case because of the 
ramifications for the Creek Nation, Oklahoma, and federal Indian law. 
While Oklahoma argued the consequences of holding for the Tribe would 
upend Oklahoma law, the Court declined to base its decision on anything 
but straightforward statutory interpretation. As a result, much of Tulsa is 
now recognized as Indian Country. 
 
52. Id. at 2480. 
53.  Id.  
54. Id. at 2481. 
55.  Id. at 2482. 
56. Id. (discussing the Act of June 27, 1898 [“The Curtis Act”], §28 and 
Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137 [“The Five Tribes Act], among others.) 
57.  Id. at 2489. 
58. Id. at 2499–2502. 
59. Id. at 2502–04. 
